03/23/2001 01:11 PM House JUD
| Audio | Topic |
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+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
March 23, 2001
1:11 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Norman Rokeberg, Chair
Representative Jeannette James
Representative John Coghill
Representative Kevin Meyer
Representative Ethan Berkowitz
Representative Albert Kookesh
MEMBERS ABSENT
Representative Scott Ogan, Vice Chair
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
HOUSE BILL NO. 172
"An Act relating to therapeutic courts for offenders and to the
authorized number of superior court judges."
- MOVED CSHB 172(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE BILL NO. 4
"An Act relating to offenses involving operating a motor
vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage or controlled substance; relating to implied
consent to take a chemical test; relating to registration of
motor vehicles; relating to presumptions arising from the amount
of alcohol in a person's breath or blood; and providing for an
effective date."
- HEARD AND HELD
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: HB 172
SHORT TITLE:THERAPEUTIC DRUG AND ALCOHOL COURTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)PORTER
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/22/01 (H) MINUTE(TRA)
02/27/01 (H) MINUTE(TRA)
02/28/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/09/01 0521 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
03/09/01 0521 (H) JUD, FIN
03/21/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/21/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 4
SHORT TITLE:OMNIBUS DRUNK DRIVING AMENDMENTS
SPONSOR(S): REPRESENTATIVE(S)ROKEBERG
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
01/08/01 0024 (H) PREFILE RELEASED 12/29/00
01/08/01 0024 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
01/08/01 0024 (H) TRA, JUD, FIN
02/22/01 (H) TRA AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 17
02/22/01 (H) Heard & Held
02/22/01 (H) MINUTE(TRA)
02/27/01 (H) TRA AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 17
02/27/01 (H) Moved CSHB 4(TRA) Out of
Committee
MINUTE(TRA)
02/28/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
02/28/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
02/28/01 0470 (H) TRA RPT CS(TRA) NT 1DNP 2NR
2AM
02/28/01 0471 (H) DNP: SCALZI, NR: KAPSNER,
KOOKESH;
02/28/01 0471 (H) AM: MASEK, KOHRING
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN1: (ADM); FN2: (ADM)
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN3: (COR); FN4: (CRT)
02/28/01 0471 (H) FN5: (HSS); FN6: (HSS)
02/28/01 0472 (H) FN7: (HSS); FN8: (HSS)
02/28/01 0472 (H) FN9: (LAW); FN10: (DPS)
02/28/01 0472 (H) REFERRED TO JUDICIARY
03/09/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/09/01 (H) Heard & Held
03/09/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/12/01 (H) JUD AT 2:30 PM CAPITOL 120
03/12/01 (H) Heard & Held
03/12/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/14/01 (H) JUD AT 2:15 PM CAPITOL 120
03/14/01 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
03/16/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/16/01 (H) Heard & Held
MINUTE(JUD)
03/19/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
03/19/01 (H) Heard & Held
03/19/01 (H) MINUTE(JUD)
03/23/01 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN PORTER
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 208
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: Sponsor of HB 172.
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General
Legal Services Section-Juneau
Criminal Division
Department of Law
PO Box 110300
Juneau, Alaska 99811-0300
POSITION STATEMENT: Answered questions regarding proposed
Amendment 6 for HB 172.
JANET SEITZ, Staff
to Representative Norman Rokeberg
Alaska State Legislature
Capitol Building, Room 118
Juneau, Alaska 99801
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 4, gave a
presentation of the provisions affecting the Division of Motor
Vehicles and answered questions.
MARY MARSHBURN, Director
Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
Department of Administration
3300B Fairbanks Street
Anchorage, Alaska 99503
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 4, presented the
DMV's concerns and answered questions.
ALVIA "STEVE" DUNNAGAN, Lieutenant
Division of Alaska State Troopers
Department of Public Safety (DPS)
5700 East Tudor Road
Anchorage, Alaska 99507
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of the provisions in HB 4
affecting the DMV, presented the DPS's position and answered
questions.
BLAIR McCUNE, Deputy Director
Central Office
Public Defender Agency (PDA)
Department of Administration
900 West 5th Avenue, Suite 200
Anchorage, Alaska 99501-2090
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 4, presented the
PDA's concerns on license revocation and vehicle forfeiture, and
answered questions.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 01-39, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR NORMAN ROKEBERG called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 1:11 p.m. Representatives
Rokeberg, Coghill, Meyer, and Berkowitz were present at the call
to order. Representatives James and Kookesh arrived as the
meeting was in progress.
HB 172 - THERAPEUTIC DRUG AND ALCOHOL COURTS
Number 0076
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the first order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 172, "An Act relating to therapeutic courts
for offenders and to the authorized number of superior court
judges."
Number 0111
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, [22-
LS0612\J.5, Luckhaupt, 3/21/01], which reads as follows:
Page 2, line 1:
Delete "Second"
Insert "Third"
Number 0126
CHAIR ROKEBERG objected for the purpose of discussion.
Number 0134
REPRESENTATIVE BRIAN PORTER, Alaska State Legislature, sponsor,
explained that Amendment 1 addressed a typographical error in HB
172; Anchorage is located in the third judicial district, not
the second judicial district.
Number 0140
CHAIR ROKEBERG removed his objection and noted there were no
further objections. Therefore, Amendment 1 was adopted.
Number 0152
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 2, [22-
LS0612\J.4, Luckhaupt, 3/21/01], which reads as follows:
Page 1, following line 11:
Insert "will focus on defendants charged with
multiple driving while intoxicated offenses and"
There being no objection, Amendment 2 was adopted.
Number 0172
CHAIR ROKEBERG made a motion to adopt Amendment 3, [22-
LS0612\J.1, Luckhaupt, 3/20/01], which reads as follows:
Page 2, line 1, following "Anchorage.":
Insert "In addition, the legislature recognizes
that district courts are currently experimenting with
and using therapeutic concepts such as those contained
in this Act. The legislature acknowledges these
efforts, encourages their continuation in the district
courts, and does not intend by this Act the
extinguishment of these efforts."
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL objected for the purpose of discussion.
Number 0203
CHAIR ROKEBERG explained that Amendment 3 recognizes the
existing district-level therapeutic courts, and encourages the
continuation of these courts and any future district-level
therapeutic courts. He noted that this was a policy statement
and would become part of uncodified law.
Number 0300
REPRESENTATIVE PORTER, as the sponsor, said he did not object to
Amendment 3.
Number 0307
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted there were no further objections.
Therefore, Amendment 3 was adopted.
Number 0318
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 4, [22-
LS0612\J.3, Luckhaupt, 3/21/01], which reads as follows:
Page 4, following line 30:
Insert a new subsection to read:
"(n) The Department of Health and Social
Services is authorized to make advances to a defendant
accepted to the therapeutic court to cover the initial
costs of participating in the treatment programs if
the defendant is otherwise without resources to pay
those costs. The court shall require as a condition
of probation that the defendant repay the department."
Reletter the following subsection accordingly.
Number 0339
CHAIR ROKEBERG objected for the purpose of discussion. He
explained that Amendment 4 creates a "grubstake" provision for
defendants who do not have funds to cover initial program fees
and Naltrexone prescriptions, and would allow for quicker entry
into programs.
Number 0388
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted there were no further objections.
Therefore, Amendment 4 was adopted.
Number 0400
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL made a motion to adopt Amendment 5, which
reads as follows [original punctuation provided]:
Page 2, following line 18:
Insert a new subsection to read:
(c) Nothing in this Act is intended to place
additional requirements or changes to other existing
specialized or general state courts.
Reletter the following subsections accordingly.
Page 3, line 19:
Delete "or municipal prosecutor"
Page 3, line 30:
Delete "or municipal prosecutor"
Page 4, lines 14-15:
Delete "or municipal prosecutor"
Page 4, line 26:
Delete "(k) of this section"
Insert "(l) of this section"
CHAIR ROKEBERG requested an explanation of Amendment 5.
Number 0418
REPRESENTATIVE PORTER explained that the municipal prosecutor
wanted to be removed from HB 172 because the district court
already has a functioning system in place for the district court
misdemeanors that it handles, and HB 172 has different timeline
requirements that would be inconvenient to follow.
Representative Porter noted that he had no objection to
Amendment 5.
Number 0452
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ inquired if Amendment 5 also removed
the Anchorage municipal prosecutor from the loop in terms of
participating in the formation of sentences for therapeutic
courts.
Number 0504
REPRESENTATIVE PORTER responded that Amendment 5 was meant to
remove any requirements in HB 172 that are specific to the
therapeutic court in the superior court. It is not intended to
prohibit the municipal prosecutor from participating in the
district court under existing rules if he or she chooses to do
so.
Number 524
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted there were no objections. Therefore,
Amendment 5 was adopted.
Number 546
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ made a motion to adopt Amendment 6,
[22-LS0612\J.7, Luckhaupt, 3/22/01], which reads as follows:
Page 3, line 23:
Delete "state or municipal prosecutor and the"
Page 3, lines 24 - 25:
Delete "prosecutor, the defendant, or the court
if the defendant's"
Insert "defendant or the court if the"
Number 0565
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL objected for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ referred to page 3, lines 23-25, and
explained that Amendment 6, with regard to subsection (e),
attempts to remove the prosecutor from the role of gatekeeper.
He said it seems to him that it would be more appropriate to
have that responsibility lie with the courts. In essence,
someone could move to get into the court, and the court could
then make a determination whether that action was appropriate.
He predicted that most of the time the defense attorneys and
prosecutors would agree with that decision, but in instances
when they don't agree, the court could resolve the conflict.
Without Amendment 6, too much discretion is in the hands of the
prosecutor. Representative Berkowitz maintained that that
discretion and responsibility should lie with the courts.
Number 0645
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that he thought he understood the concept
of Amendment 6, but wanted to know why Amendment 5 did not
remove the municipal prosecutor from page 3, line 23.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ attempted to clarify that under
Amendment 6, someone who was charged under municipal statute
would not have (indisc.--multiple speakers).
REPRESENTATIVE PORTER explained that the prosecutor's office is
the driver of the train of prosecution by law, by history, and
by tradition. It is the responsibility of [the prosecutor's
office] to make these kinds of decisions, and he said he thought
that leaving it as is [without Amendment 6] would be the
appropriate action.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ countered that the prosecutor's office
would need to develop a protocol or policy in order to determine
who would qualify for therapeutic court, so that it would not be
an arbitrary assignment. And once that due-process realm is
entered into, the judge might as well be the arbiter; it would
cut out a step whereby motions could result, such as when a
defendant said he/she was willing to enter into the [therapeutic
court] but the prosecutor was not allowing it in violation of
prosecutorial policy, or without good cause. He suggested that
going straight to the court would result in a relatively
expeditious resolution.
REPRESENTATIVE PORTER responded by saying that that particular
issue has not been raised in either charge bargaining or
sentence plea-bargaining, which, in effect, is what [the
provisions of HB 172] come down to. He explained that in the
existing therapeutic courts, there is a requirement that the
prosecutor advise the defendant that participation in a
therapeutic court mandates a guilty plea. He said he did not
think defendants would plead guilty if participation in a
therapeutic court was not the appropriate decision.
Number 0888
DEAN J. GUANELI, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Legal
Services Section-Juneau, Criminal Division, Department of Law,
noted that although he had missed testimony from the prior
meeting regarding the issues encompassed in Amendment 6, he had
heard enough about it to respond to those points. He said that
there were three reasons why he thought Amendment 6 was not a
good idea. The first reason was given [at the prior meeting] by
Judge Wanamaker, who said that in order for this type of program
to work, the prosecutor must consent. Mr. Guaneli added that he
himself thought that was appropriate. This program will require
a lot of time and effort by all the agencies involved, and it is
important for the prosecutor to have an investment in whether a
defendant succeeds, which would not happen if the defendant got
into the program over the objections of the prosecutor.
MR. GUANELI said the second reason was more of a practical one.
Oftentimes, prosecutors know more about certain defendants and
their past, or ongoing, activities than anyone else does. For
example, there may be an ongoing investigation of a defendant
for a child-abuse offense, or for a narcotics offense. There
may be things about that defendant that [the DOL] does not want
disclosed to anybody, even a judge, but which could be grounds
for objecting to the defendant's participation in the program.
Number 0970
MR. GUANELI explained that the third reason was a legal one.
Constitutionally, there are three branches of government, and
the executive branch has a role in law enforcement as well as a
role in prosecution. The type of program [encompassed in HB
172] involves agreements regarding what is going to happen to a
defendant, as well as agreements regarding certain conditions
that both the defendant and the state must abide by, all of
which require the consent of the prosecutor. The Alaska Supreme
Court has cautioned judges to refrain from unilaterally engaging
in plea negotiations with defendants because that is the
responsibility of the prosecutor. Judges can only accept or
reject the agreement brought before them. He noted that there
is Alaska case law on that point. Mr. Guaneli finalized by
saying that for all of the aforementioned reasons the DOL thinks
that the prosecutor should have a consenting role; that will
ensure the program will work, and was also why HB 172 was
drafted as it was.
Number 1056
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ responded to the suggestion that
prosecutors know more than the courts by saying that if that
were indeed the case, then that is why there are courts - so
that the prosecutor might make the court aware of all the facts.
In instances when there is an ongoing investigation, or if there
might be something that would be compromised by the defendant's
participation in a therapeutic court, there would also be
opportunities to argue, even obliquely, or by proceeding under
seal, that therapeutic court would not be the best option. He
added that he thought that cases involving people who had DWIs
in addition to being the subject of a major investigation would
be the exception rather than the rule, and the therapeutic
courts should not be built around that problem.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, in response to the issue of separation
of powers, said that according to his understanding, this was
not a charging decision [being made under the program created by
HB 172], which would appropriately be made by the executive
branch. Instead, it was, in essence, a sentencing decision.
Thus, he said, it was fully acceptable and appropriate that
someone should not get into a therapeutic court unless he or she
had made an admission of guilt. Once that admission of guilt is
made, the sentencing phase is entered into, and this phase has
always been the responsibility of the courts. He said he
thought it should not be characterized as a plea negotiation
situation; rather, it is simply a hearing to determine the
appropriateness of therapeutic court for a particular defendant,
and the prosecutor's office is free to argue either for or
against the action. In conclusion, Representative Berkowitz
offered that Amendment 6 would provide further checks and
balances to the system, and would not be a diminution of the
executive branch's authority to charge; it would simply be a
check on that authority by both the courts and the individual
defendants.
Number 1192
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that because of both prior testimony and
his own research, he was inclined to favor Amendment 6. It had
become apparent to him that the position of the attorney
general's office as it related to existing therapeutic-court
activities was not a favorable one. On the contrary, to a
certain degree, [the attorney general's office] has been
obstructive. Chair Rokeberg requested that Mr. Guaneli and the
attorney general give their assurance of full cooperation in the
pilot program on this particular issue.
MR. GUANELI noted that he did not wish to plow over old ground
regarding why the DOL was reluctant to engage in the
experimental wellness court program in Anchorage. He
acknowledged, however, that the Anchorage prosecutors work for
his office, and therefore he was accountable for the actions of
those prosecutors. He emphasized that the DOL had a role in
crafting HB 172, and is slated to get funding for participating
in this pilot program; the DOL would be an active participant in
this program as it is set out in HB 172. In addition, he said
that the DOL would like to see a decrease in the number of
felony drunk drivers in Anchorage, as well as throughout the
rest of state. And if this program can help towards that end,
the DOL is all for it and willing to invest the time and effort
needed to see the program succeed. He noted, however, that it
would require the DOL's unconditional involvement, which means
fulfilling the role of gatekeeper to ensure that the most
appropriate people enter into the program. There are not enough
openings in the pilot program to fit in everyone who gets
charged with felony drunk driving, and decisions will have to be
made regarding who gets into the program, he concluded.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ, in defense of Amendment 6, reiterated
that this is not a charging decision; the defendant should have
due process in order to get into the program. Prosecutors are
not infallible, and to make the prosecutor the sole gatekeeper
without the backstop of the courts, he said he thinks is not
what people have in mind when thinking about checks and
balances.
Number 1375
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that the objection to Amendment 6 was
maintained.
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Berkowitz, Kookesh,
and Rokeberg voted for Amendment 6. Representatives Coghill,
Meyer, and James voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 6
failed by a vote of 3-3.
Number 1395
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ moved to report HB 172, as amended, out
of committee with individual recommendations and the
accompanying fiscal notes.
CHAIR ROKEBERG objected for the purpose of attaching an
additional fiscal note from the committee, which would provide
$85,000 to the existing therapeutic courts so that they could
continue operations in the coming fiscal year.
Number 1449
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ modified his motion to encompass the
addition of the committee fiscal note to HB 172. There being no
further objection, CSHB 172(JUD) was reported from the House
Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 4 - OMNIBUS DRUNK DRIVING AMENDMENTS
Number 1457
CHAIR ROKEBERG announced that the next order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 4, "An Act relating to offenses involving
operating a motor vehicle, aircraft, or watercraft while under
the influence of an alcoholic beverage or controlled substance;
relating to implied consent to take a chemical test; relating to
registration of motor vehicles; relating to presumptions arising
from the amount of alcohol in a person's breath or blood; and
providing for an effective date." [Before the committee was
CSHB 4(TRA).]
CHAIR ROKEBERG called an at-ease from 1:36 p.m. to 1:37 p.m.
Number 1513
JANET SEITZ, Staff to Representative Norman Rokeberg, Alaska
State Legislature, explained that some of the provisions in CSHB
4(TRA) that will impact the Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV)
include: refusing to register a vehicle if the owner has a
license suspension/revocation - meaning that person does not
have a valid driver's license and/or that person's license or
privilege to obtain a license has been suspended or revoked;
changing some timelines regarding court notification; changing
the license revocation process; raising the fees for
reinstatement of driver's licenses; addition of an "enabler"
section that will strengthen statutes prohibiting a person from
letting a drunk driver use that person's vehicle; adding the
penalty of vehicle registration revocation for certain DWI
(driving while intoxicated) offenses; addition of a provision
allowing the DMV to review, upon request, permanently revoked
driver's licenses; addition of provisions placing the onus of
surrendering registration plates on the offender after
conviction; and establishment of an Alaska Repeat Offender
Status System (AROSS) that shall be made available to the
public. She added that the DMV has expressed some concerns
about some of these proposed changes to the DWI statutes, and
that amendments addressing some of those concerns will be
forthcoming. Ms. Seitz noted that in CSHB 4(TRA), vehicle
impoundment and vehicle forfeiture are mandated on both second
and third offenses. [She later clarified that the language
mandates vehicle forfeiture on the third offense and allows it
on the second.]
Number 1753
MARY MARSHBURN, Director, Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV),
Department of Administration, testified via teleconference. She
referred to Section 6, and said that this provision, which has
the largest impact on the DMV, will allow the DMV to refuse to
register a vehicle, or renew a registration, if the applicant
did not have a valid driver's license due to its having been
suspended or revoked. In terms of volume (with the caveat that
this provision would apply to all suspensions and revocations,
not just those that are alcohol-related), last year there were
about 20,000 suspensions and revocations. [The DMV]
suspends/revokes for points, for child support, for [lack of]
mandatory insurance, for financial responsibility, as well as
for alcohol-related offenses; all these combined constitute a
significant volume. This provision, as [the DMV] understands
it, would not apply to vehicles that were registered in a
business name, or to leased vehicles.
MS. MARSHBURN explained that the databases for vehicles and
driver's licenses are separate; there is no electronic link.
Because of this, she could not, for example, put in her own name
and driver's license number in the driver's license database and
get information on any vehicles that she owns. In order to
determine which vehicles a person owns, that person has to give
the DMV the vehicle registration numbers, or all of the names
under which those vehicles are registered. There is no
automatic link, and that hinders [the DMV] in doing a number of
the things required by HB 4, she said. She also said that [the
DMV] does not believe that linking the two systems will be
effective, either in cost or time, in terms of HB 4. She
explained that [the DMV] has approximately 350,000
registration/registration-renewal transactions per year, and
that there are four areas in the [DMV's] registration program
which would be affected by the refusal-to-register provision. A
vehicle can be registered either through the DMV's business
partners, through the Internet, via the telephone, or by
individuals who come into a DMV field office. [The DMV] uses
business partners - car dealers and emission inspection stations
(I/M stations) - to process registrations. These stations and
dealers do not have access to the driver's license database
because that information is confidential.
Number 1906
MS. MARSHBURN said that in order to implement the provisions of
CSHB 4(TRA), [the DMV] would develop a simple inquiry program.
With this program, the dealer would obtain the driver's license
number from the owner and input it in the database, which would
then return either a "yes" or "no record" response. The dealer
would be able to physically view the driver's license and
physically ascertain both the number on it and whether the
picture on driver's license matches the person who is applying
for ownership of a vehicle. Although there would not be a cost
to the state for this [program], she explained, vehicle sales
might be affected if the database returns a no-record response.
She also cautioned that not all dealers have online access to
the DMV; only some of the dealers do.
MS. MARSHBURN said [the DMV] can envision two scenarios taking
place at dealerships. One is that dealers might choose to
simply place a sign that says that in order to purchase/register
a vehicle, a valid driver's license that has not been suspended
or revoked must be provided. She added that such a sign might
help dealers in terms of their customers. Another alternative
dealers might opt for would be to complete the sale, give the
individual a temporary permit, send the transaction to DMV for
processing, and then let the DMV refuse to register the vehicle.
She noted, however, that dealers might choose not to partner
with [the DMV] because of the difficulties posed by the refusal-
to-register provision.
MS. MARSHBURN explained that in researching the impact of HB 4,
[the DMV] sent an inquiry (via the American Association for
Motor Vehicles Administrators) to the rest of states asking
which of them, if any, revoke vehicle registrations and how they
go about it. She said that 13 states have replied thus far, and
of those, only Michigan denies a vehicle registration on the
third [DWI] offense, although it does not actually revoke
existing registrations. She added that this is a new program,
having started July 1st of last year, and as such, Michigan does
not have much experience with it in terms of any potential
future problems. She has called Michigan and asked what the
development/implementations costs were, but has not yet received
an answer. It is an Internet-based system that is available to
dealers and to lien holders only; it is not available to the
public because the public does not have access, normally, to
driver's license information, nor can the public obtain driver's
license IDs (identifications). Ms. Marshburn said that when she
asked what kinds of problems Michigan was experiencing with the
new program, she was told that dealers in Michigan have
complained about having to turn away sales, although to date no
specific volume data was available.
Number 2080
MS. MARSHBURN, with regard to Internet and phone registrations,
said that these two areas of the DMV's registration program are
completely automated from start to finish; for this reason,
there is no way that anyone can physically view a license and
thereby physically determine that a driver's license that is
used for Internet or telephone registration actually belongs to
the person who owns the vehicle. And because the vehicle
registration and the driver's license databases are not linked,
there is really no way to complete these transactions [in
compliance with the refusal-to-register provision of HB 4]. She
added that the volume of these types of transactions is 30,000,
and that what [the DMV] envisions happening is a discontinuance
of Internet and phone registrations, which would result in these
individuals' coming in to a DMV field office to register a
vehicle.
MS. MARSHBURN further said that the majority of [the DMV's]
renewal transactions (250,000-plus) occur in [the DMV] field
offices. To refuse to register a vehicle means that every
registration and every registration renewal has to be manually
checked for everyone who is on that registration. She explained
that most registrations are for multiple owners; for purposes of
calculations, [the DMV] estimates registration at 1.5 owners.
The additional time that it would take to manually look up each
owner on a vehicle registration would add to the personnel
services cost, which is included in [the DMV's] fiscal note.
She added that the mail process would be affected as well; [the
DMV] envisions a "back-and-forth" process - making inquiries if
the registration that is sent in by mail turns out to have an
owner whose license has been suspended or revoked.
MS. MARSHBURN explained that under current law, whenever [the
DMV] refuses to register a vehicle, [the DMV] is required to
offer that individual the opportunity for a hearing. She added
that about 25 percent of driver's license suspensions and
revocations end up in hearings, and that same percentage was
used to calculate the number of hearings which could result from
refusing to register a vehicle. For this reason, the fiscal
note reflects an additional hearing officer.
Number 2190
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked whether, currently, a person accused of DWI
could buy and register a vehicle without having a valid driver's
license.
MS. MARSHBURN said that was correct, and that according to her
interpretation of CSHB 4(TRA), a first-time-DWI offender would
not lose his/her existing vehicle registration but would be
prohibited from buying and registering a new vehicle during that
revocation period.
CHAIR ROKEBERG surmised that some of the aforementioned problems
are a result of the two databases not communicating with each
other.
MS. MARSHBURN replied that that was correct. One database
originated in the Department of Revenue (DOR), and the other
originated in the Department of Public Safety (DPS), and the two
are completely different. The driver's license database is
keyed towards identifying the driver, whereas the vehicle
database is keyed towards identification of a piece of property,
and thus the question of who actually owns it is incidental.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said that the idea was to have a public database
for felony DWI offenders [AROSS] available on the Internet. He
asked whether [the DMV] could then consult the Internet in order
to determine whether a registration should be issued.
MS. MARSHBURN referred to the aforementioned simple inquiry
program that [the DMV] would develop and make available to
dealers. She said that the dealers would have the ability to
ask the individual who was purchasing the car for his/her
driver's license in order to input the number into this
database, and in this way, the dealers could verify the
identification of the people standing before them, and be able
to key that data into the inquiry program. [The DMV] cannot
allow dealers access to [the DMV's] driving record file, she
explained, but they at least would have access to a yes/no
inquiry system. Driver's license numbers and date of birth
(DOB) information is not available to the general public. Even
Michigan's database is applicable only to dealers and lien
holders because driving record information is protected
information.
Number 2334
MS. MARSHBURN commented that she had previously given testimony
on the .08 [blood alcohol concentration (BAC) provisions of HB
4] and said that through recent correspondence with Ms. Seitz,
she was aware of the new information that would affect the DMV's
fiscal notes. She then referred to Sections 12, 15, and 27 and
said they all interact. She remarked that she recalls
discussing possible amendments that might affect those sections,
but not having seen them, she did not have any specific comments
regarding how those possible amendments would affect Sections
12, 15, and 27.
MS. SEITZ confirmed that there were amendments forthcoming that
would address the timelines encompassed by those sections.
MS. MARSHBURN explained that currently a first-time-DWI offender
receives a 90-day license revocation and is eligible for a
limited license for the last 60 days of that revocation. Pieces
of Sections 12, 15, and 27 all work together to set up a two-
tiered revocation for someone whose BAC is between .08 and .10.
If the court suspends the sentence, it would result in a 45-day
revocation with eligibility for a limited license (with an
interlock device) for the final 30 days, which would effectively
result in a 15-day revocation. The sentence is suspended by the
court if the offender agrees to complete a year of probation
without another offense, pays the cost of screening and/or
treatment, completes three days of community work service (CWS),
and pays a $500 fine. By agreeing to these conditions in the
diversion program, the offender has the shorter revocation
period of 45 days and avoids the three-day jail time. On the
other hand, she explained, for the same DWI offender whose BAC
falls between .08 and .10, Sections 12, 15, and 27 set up a 90-
day revocation with eligibility for a limited license (with an
interlock device) for the last 60 days.
TAPE 01-39, SIDE B
Number 2468
MS. MARSHBURN noted that currently the DMV revokes a license for
90 days on the eighth day after an individual has been given
"notice and order" of license revocation stemming from a DWI
arrest, and [the DMV] would continue to do so, she added,
because HB 4 does not affect that procedure. She explained that
[the DMV] would not know whether a sentence has been suspended
until the offender goes through the court process. Therefore,
[the DMV] could not give the offender a limited license after 15
days, or shortly after, the time when he/she began the
revocation period. For [the DMV], essentially, there would be
no 45-day or 90-day option; it would simply be court process.
She said that according to her understanding of these provisions
in CSHB 4(TRA), she surmised that there would be some first-time
offenders who, if given the choice of three days in jail and a
limited license for a longer period of time with the 90-day
revocation versus serving a year on probation under interlock
without another offense, would opt for the 90-day revocation.
She noted that for DMV, the bigger problem is one of timing, and
she acknowledged that amendments were being drafted to address
that problem.
MS. MARSHBURN then referred to Sections 31 and 33. Said that in
Section 31 the DMV revokes the registration for a felony [DWI]
offender and then reissues that registration to the co-owner -
omitting the name of the felony offender from the registration.
Section 33 requires a vehicle's license plates to be surrendered
by a second-time (or higher) [DWI] offender. She reported that
last year [the DMV's] volume on offenders with two or more
offenses was approximately 1,500. For purposes of the fiscal
note, she explained that these two sections were grouped
together because the work actions on these are roughly the same
thing - it's a manual process. [The DMV] would secure the
vehicle information (probably from the court), and what would
then be entailed is an individual "look up" of each vehicle,
flagging the record internally and developing a "tickler," and
stopping the automatic renewal.
Number 2353
MS. MARSHBURN explained that there would be some modification to
[the DMV's] IT (information technology) system. Currently, a
registration and a title are identical, with one set of owners
who are identical on both documents. [The DMV] would develop a
registration different from the title because the title would
remain the same. The title is the "vehicle" of ownership; the
registration is essentially the vehicle of use. Thus, the IT
system would have to be modified to reflect two sets of owners,
and [the DMV] would thereby create a registration and title that
differ. This would require that all vehicle owners be notified
that this action is taking place and what the effects would be
until the vehicle received its new registration or title, as
well as reissuing that registration. At the time that the
revocation was up, [the DMV] would essentially go back and do
this process a second time to convert the records back.
MS. MARSHBURN said she appreciated and understood the efforts
and intentions regarding the returning of plates. She noted,
however, that in rural areas of Alaska there are not DMV offices
available, and this would mean that offenders would have to mail
in their plates, and that vehicles would be out of service until
new plates are obtained. She said she thought she had just
recently heard that vehicles would be forfeited on a second
offense, but she had been under the impression that forfeiture
would take place only on the third (or more) offense. Either
way, she added, the DMV would not be involved in the vehicle
forfeiture except in terms of furnishing records to the DPS and
impoundment companies.
CHAIR ROKEBERG remarked that it could, however, affect the
fiscal notes. He confirmed that CSHB 4(TRA) does [allow]
forfeiture on the second offense. He commented that the current
fiscal note from [the DMV] for CSHB 4(TRA) reflects impoundment
for second offenses.
MS. MARSHBURN said whether a vehicle is impounded or not, [the
DMV's] record still has to be changed; it still has to reflect
that that offense has taken place and that the vehicle cannot be
registered by a certain person, and then [the DMV] has to change
the record back again. Thus the forfeiture or impoundment does
not affect the DMV's end of the process.
Number 2336
MS. MARSHBURN referred to Section 47, which establishes the
AROSS, and said [the DMV] feels that this more properly belongs
in the DPS. This database, as [the DMV] interprets Section 47,
would have to be available to anyone, be current, and be
accurate. [The DMV] proposes [instead] to develop an Internet
application that returns the information if the individual is a
"public offender." This [application] would interact/interface
with [the DMV's] system via the Internet. [The application] has
to be able to calculate and modify times and records. In
addition, [the DMV] has to find a way to accurately identify,
within the law, felony offenders, because a person should not be
listed as a felony offender unless he/she really is a felony
offender.
MS. MARSHBURN spoke next on the issue of revenue from increased
reinstatement fees for alcohol offenses, and said that [the DMV]
projected an increase in revenue of approximately $350,000. In
a concluding assessment of CSHB 4(TRA), Ms. Marshburn said she
knew that the intent was to remove the alcohol offender from
behind the wheel of a vehicle, and if that person cannot be
removed, then make it doubly difficult, by any method, for that
individual to drive a vehicle. She said that if the individual
has his/her license taken away, and yet continues to drive, she
thinks that refusal to register will have some effect, but she
did not believe that it would be nearly as effective as other
methods. She offered that the money spent on what the refusal-
to-register provision will cost could be more effective if
applied elsewhere.
CHAIR ROKEBERG expressed frustration that [the DMV's] databases
would not interact without a significant investment in capital,
and that this inability created an impediment to many of the
things that he wanted to do with HB 4. He asked whether [the
DMV] concurred that its whole IT system was a mess.
MS. MARSHBURN agreed that the inability of [the DMV's] databases
to interact did create some impediments for some of the
provisions in CSHB 4(TRA). However, she said she would not
classify the current database systems as a mess. The databases
are very accurate and work very well for their intended
purposes. But, she added, they are not very flexible in terms
of their ability to interact. She said she would love to be
able to enter "Mary Marshburn" into the vehicle database and
come up with every vehicle registered under her name, but that
was not possible because the database requires an exact match
and she has vehicles registered under "M. Marshburn," "Mary
Marshburn," and "Mary Coffee," and she and her husband have
vehicles registered in both their names.
Number 2006
MS. MARSHBURN explained that what was needed were identifiers,
such as the requirement for a full name. And although CSHB
4(TRA) does begin with that provision, other identifiers are
also needed. For example, a DOB (she said she was not even
going to bring up use of a social security number) and a
driver's license number would be needed to help begin creating a
link. "We need to begin to establish the thread of linking the
two [databases] together," she remarked. As she had noted
earlier, the purpose of the vehicle system has always been the
identification of a particular vehicle and the protection and
identification of that property, and the purpose of the driver's
license system has been the positive identification of an
individual.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he had heard some frustration regarding
situations wherein a multiple offender has a series of either
revocations or suspensions that start "stacking up," but because
it is possible to get a license back in a statutory/regulatory
way - and even though there could be an overhanging suspension
from another offense - the offender is able to get his/her
driver's license back. He asked Ms. Marshburn if this scenario
is possible.
MS. MARSHBURN replied that without looking at a specific set of
circumstances, she could not see how that is possible.
CHAIR ROKEBERG, to clarify, asked if it would be feasible to
have two outstanding revocations, and then, before the first one
expires, to regain the license while the second revocation is
still outstanding and has not yet gone into effect.
MS. MARSHBURN said she suspected it would be possible if the
revocations were running concurrently, or if it were a court
revocation and an administrative revocation, because the
administrative revocation usually takes place sooner and the
court can then run its revocation concurrently. Normally, when
there are two separate offenses such as two DWIs, or a DWI and a
"pickup" for driving with a license suspended, those are not
concurrent revocations; they are consecutive revocations. She
said she could not see the aforementioned scenario happening
other than under her first example. She further replied that
when there is a court case and an administrative revocation, the
court will almost always, unless the law prohibits, run the
revocation that it imposes concurrent to [the DMV's revocation],
which, she surmised, was what Chair Rokeberg was thinking of.
She added that the DMV's revocation moves faster because [the
DMV] revokes on the eighth day. In many instances, the
individual does not get to court until later, and by the time
the case is acted upon, a good part or all of the DMV's
administrative revocation has been run. The court runs the
revocation concurrent to the DMV, and the individual can be
eligible to have his/her license reinstated after he/she leaves
court, providing any other conditions have been met.
Number 1822
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that there seems to be success in other
states with impounding the license plates, and that CSHB 4(TRA)
requires offenders to turn in their plates after conviction. He
asked how [the DMV] would be affected if the police were to
impound the license plates at the time of arrest.
MS. MARSHBURN said [the DMV] would need to receive very timely
notice of that occurrence because it would be much the same sort
of process as discussed regarding Sections 31 and 33. [The DMV]
would need to go into the database and annotate the records to
reflect that that plate was no longer on that vehicle, and what
the action was, and then, at the end of the revocation period,
[the DMV] would need to change the record back again. She
explained that in Michigan, and probably in another state or
two, the police officer confiscates the plates and gives the
offender a paper [license] plate, which goes in the back window
of the vehicle for the necessary period of time, until he/she
goes to court and the case is adjudicated. [The DMV] would have
to develop a system for issuing the paper [license] plates, and
the confiscation would have to be done by a police officer. She
added that the paper [license] plate was necessary because it
authorizes a vehicle to be driven by someone else who has a
valid driver's license.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ said that the current procedure on a
DWI offense is to confiscate the offender's driver's license
following the intoximeter test, and that confiscation is good
for seven days.
Number 1704
MS. MARSHBURN said that was essentially correct. The officer,
at the time, gives the individual what is called "a notice and
order," which gives the offender instructions on what to do
should he/she want to file an administrative hearing. That
notice and order serves as a temporary license for seven days,
but if the offender then requests an administrative hearing
through the DMV, it also serves as a temporary license until the
hearing. She confirmed that while a person may have his/her
permanent driver's license confiscated, at that time he/she is
given a temporary license designed to tide the person over,
either until he/she gets into court or gets his/her affairs in
order.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said it seemed to him as though confiscating an
offender's license plate was proving to be more effective than
some other solutions, and he voiced concern over the cost of
what he saw as subsidizing the DMV's IT problem instead of
focusing on keeping drunk drivers off the road. He asked Ms.
Marshburn what the current law was regarding DWLS (driving while
license suspended), and how CSHB 4(TRA) would affect that law.
MS. MARSHBURN said that a DWLS offense currently has a ten-day
jail sentence and 80 hours of CWS, and although Section 19
refers to the offense of driving while a license is suspended or
revoked, it does not make any substantive changes to that
sentence.
CHAIR ROKEBERG commented that he would rather spend the money on
"nailing" habitual multiple-DWI offenders and those people who
drive with suspended/revoked licenses because they constitute
the bigger problem.
Number 1486
ALVIA "STEVE" DUNNAGAN, Lieutenant, Division of Alaska State
Troopers, Department of Public Safety (DPS), testified via
teleconference, and said that there were several complications
for the DMV that will be hard to overcome. He said he thinks
that the concept of vehicle forfeiture has a lot of merit, and
that if vehicle forfeiture were mandatory for third-time DWI
offenders, it would go a long way towards deterring DWI. He
noted that he did not detect too many substantive changes in
CSHB 4(TRA) to current law regarding [driver's license]
suspensions.
CHAIR ROKEBERG remarked that it was his gut feeling that
multiple offenders are commonly found inebriated and driving
again without a license. He asked whether that feeling was
justified, and questioned whether that shouldn't be the person
that they concentrate their efforts on.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN confirmed that there are many incidents in
which that scenario occurs; people will be intoxicated and be
caught driving for the third or fourth time without a driver's
license because they cannot get one, for example, until 2030,
based on their previous history. With regard to the issue of a
person who has a suspended driver's license being able to get
another one, he said he could not think of any such
circumstances under which that would occur. And while he
acknowledged that that scenario might be possible, he pointed
out that the DMV records that the DPS receives when an officer
pulls over a suspect and checks on that person's driving history
are fairly well laid out and easy to read with regard to
suspensions/revocations and effective dates.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN, on the DPS's current procedure for making a
typical DWI arrest, explained that if a trooper makes an arrest,
the person is arrested and something is done with the vehicle,
such as impounding it or turning it over to a responsible third
party who is immediately available to take control of the
vehicle. The person is taken to one of the stations, is offered
an intoximeter test, and is asked to perform that test. If the
person performs the intoximeter test, then the notice and order
of revocation is read to that person, the driver's license is
seized, and the person is given the temporary seven-day license,
which provides that person with the information on due process
for filing for the administrative hearing. The driver's license
is then sent into the DMV along with the revocation form, and
that person has the opportunity to apply for the hearing. Once
he/she does that, the limited license is extended to the hearing
date; if he/she does have a hearing, then the trooper testifies
at that hearing, and the DMV renders its decision based on the
hearing.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN said if the vehicle is impounded, it just
goes to whatever towing company is called to the scene; the
trooper fills out a form that says the vehicle is impounded, and
it gets taken away. The vehicle can be gotten out of
impoundment by a person who is able to provide proof of
ownership and pay all the fees that have been deemed against it
from the tow company. For the vehicle forfeiture purposes of
CSHB 4(TRA), that forfeiture would not take effect until after
conviction, so the vehicle could, in essence, be impounded and
then be released, and still be out on the road system until
after the conviction is entered, at which time [the DPS] would
have to get the vehicle back.
Number 1239
CHAIR ROKEBERG, noting that license-plate impoundment seemed to
have some deterrent effect in other states, asked what kinds of
problems/advantages a similar program would present to [the
DPS].
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN opined that having to take license plates
would not be that much of a problem - [the DPS] could have the
tow company take the license plate. He added that [the DPS]
currently has the authority to seize license plates under
certain circumstances; for example, if the tag is erroneous or
fake, or if the license plate does not belong to the particular
car that it's on. Therefore, if seizing a license plate were
just one more step in the DWI-arrest process, it would not cause
that much inconvenience. However, since the forfeiture would
not take place until after the conviction, there would have to
be some mechanism in place for that person, or a family member
of that person, to have access to the vehicle until after a
legal determination has been made on the fate of the vehicle.
MS. MARSHBURN further explained in response to questions that
the administrative hearing is not automatic; the notice and
order of revocation simply informs the individual that he/she
has the right to a hearing. If that individual does not request
a hearing within seven days, his/her license is automatically
revoked on the eighth day for the period of time set in statute
for that particular offense. If the person requests a hearing
and the subsequent decision is to revoke the license, the
revocation period begins on day that determination is made. At
the end of the revocation period, the individual must go through
the reinstatement process to get his/her license back. In
response to the question of whether license plates could be
confiscated through a procedure similar to driver's license
revocations, she said that it could be done that way but it
might engender more hearings. She did, however, affirm that
perhaps having waivers for cases where the vehicle had a
registered co-owner could cut down on the amount of those
hearings.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ clarified that what was being discussed
with regard to driver's license revocations was an
administrative proceeding, not a criminal proceeding; the
criminal proceeding would begin, in all likelihood, within the
aforementioned seven-day window.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said his focus was on instant punishment of
offenders and separating automobiles from offenders. He noted
that he was contemplating removing the refusal-to-register
provisions because of the cost involved as well as the possibly
limited effect it might have on the goal.
Number 1004
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ asked what normally happens to the
vehicle when someone is arrested for DWI.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN reiterated that the vehicle is either
impounded or turned over to a sober third party if one is
immediately available to take control of the vehicle. By law,
the trooper has to remain onsite until the vehicle can either be
released to someone or towed away. The troopers do not move the
vehicle themselves except when the vehicle is creating a traffic
hazard; at most, in those instances, they would merely try to
push it off to the side of the road. He affirmed that in all
areas of the state, the troopers have vendors who will come and
remove vehicles from DWI-arrest sites; in the more remote areas,
it may just take longer for a vendor to arrive. He added that
the troopers have up to four hours in which to get a person who
is arrested to an intoximeter for a breath test that would still
be usable in court. He noted that during that four-hour period
of time, a person's BAC level might be going down a bit, but it
could also be going up, depending on when the person stopped
drinking.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN, regarding the concept of confiscating
license plates, said that it has some merit. He pointed out
that if someone were stopped and arrested for DWI, and the
license plates were confiscated, the individual could not drive
that vehicle without license plates because he/she would get
stopped every time. He suggested that the concept merits more
investigation and consideration.
Number 0725
BLAIR McCUNE, Deputy Director, Central Office, Public Defender
Agency (PDA), Department of Administration, testified via
teleconference. Regarding license revocations, he said that
Alaska already has some pretty long periods of license
revocation, and CSHB 4(TRA) increases them, especially for
felony DWIs. Referring to page 21, line 1, he noted that the
statute would permanently revoke a person's license, although he
also noted that there was a provision included whereby after ten
years without any further offenses, the person could apply to
have the permanent revocation changed and have his/her license
reinstated. He said [the PDA] believes that license revocations
are not the major deterrent to DWI; Alaska already has some
pretty serious and strong penalties such as fines, fees, and
jail time that are imposed on DWI offenders.
MR. McCUNE said that according to the court system, there were
4,500 DWLS cases statewide, which constitute a big problem for
the criminal justice system. He opined that under the current
system, people tend to lose hope and therefore do not take the
steps needed to get their licenses reinstated. He suggested
that what the committee wanted as an end result was to have
sober, licensed, insured drivers on the road. He noted that the
DMV requires people to have SR22 insurance (special risk premium
insurance) before they can get their license reinstated.
MR. McCUNE said [the PDA] hopes that there would be some way
whereby, if people demonstrate sobriety for one or two years -
even if they have had a felony DWI - that they could have their
driver's license back before ten years have gone by. Ten years
just seems to be an extraordinarily long time, he said, and he
remarked again that there are long periods of revocation under
current law already. He added that [the PDA] thinks this
provision appears counterproductive. He also noted that
according to John Richards, the municipal prosecutor for the
Municipality of Anchorage, the [municipal] diversion program has
been quite successful in getting licensed, insured drivers on
the road; instead of immediately prosecuting people who have
license revocations, Mr. Richards tells offenders that if they
can pay a fee and get in the program, he will offer them
assistance in getting their licenses reinstated. Mr. McCune
went on to say that a lot of the clients that he works with are
not good at completing paperwork or dealing with bureaucratic
situations, and this [municipal] diversion program gives people
help in those areas, although the people still have to pay for
the SR22 insurance in addition to their fees.
Number 400
MR. McCUNE noted that in CSHB 4(TRA) the reinstatement fees have
increased quite a bit. He referred to page 10, beginning on
line 27, and said that [the PDA] believes the reinstatement fees
should cover the DMV's costs and not be used as punishment,
since Alaska law already does enough of that. Alaska does not
need to create extra barriers to people who are trying get their
licenses reinstated, he offered. On the issue of vehicle
forfeitures, he said [the PDA] thinks that these forfeitures can
be really onerous, and that vehicle forfeitures should be
discretionary with the judge. Vehicle forfeiture makes a big
difference to his clients' families, he said; when the vehicle
is co-owned, for example, the innocent co-owner has to pay half
the assessed value of the vehicle, which tends to disrupt
families.
REPRESENTATIVE COGHILL said it seems to him as though "the bar
is high and the punishment swift when we take a license away,
but it doesn't seem quite so much [so], after the fact."
MR. McCUNE responded that the penalties for driving with a
revoked license are strong; for a second offense it is a
mandatory ten days in jail, for example. For a DWL (driving
without a valid license) offense, the court wants that person to
show proof that he/she had the privilege to drive but had just
not gone through the hoops necessary to get the license, and
will then give that person some time to get the license and
bring it before the court. He added that often, when the person
brings that valid license before the court, the case is
dismissed because the goal is to get a licensed, insured driver
on the road.
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that he had some concerns regarding the
aforementioned topics.
TAPE 01-40, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR ROKEBERG asked Lieutenant Dunnagan whether he would
characterize HB 4 as an effective weapon for the DPS to use in
accomplishing the bill's purpose - helping to remove some of the
habitual drunk drivers and other drunk drivers from the road.
Was there general satisfaction with HB 4, or was something
missing, he also asked.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN replied that he believes that there are some
good, strong points to CSHB 4(TRA), and that it will help to
reduce some of the repeat offenders, and will act as an early
and effective deterrent for those people who actually consider
the law and think about what they are doing before they make
choices. The big issue that everybody has, he observed, is the
actual forfeiture of the vehicle, and while he has been working
on the fiscal note to decrease it, it is going to cost money for
[the DPS] to effectively participate in that forfeiture under
the mandatory terms that are outlined in CSHB 4(TRA).
MS. SEITZ, for the members' benefit, cited page 18, line 6, as
having the discretionary language for vehicle forfeiture on the
second offense, and page 21, line 11, as having the mandatory
language for vehicle forfeiture on the third or higher offense.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN, with regard to the fiscal note, remarked
that mandatory vehicle forfeiture on the third or higher offense
(as opposed to having it be mandatory on the second offense)
will be substantially cheaper because the actual number of
felony DWIs is lower than the number of second-time DWIs. He
added that he believes the fiscal note for mandatory vehicle
forfeiture on the third or higher DWI offense is approximately
$107,000. This calculation was based on an average of
historical numbers - 500 convictions with 50 percent of those
vehicles forfeited, and then [the DPS] would try to give away 75
percent of those forfeited vehicles to local governments,
nonprofits, and governmental entities such as those that
administer the VPSO (Village Public Safety Officers) programs in
rural Alaska. Lieutenant Dunnagan went on to say that the .08
[BAC] provision coupled with the rest of CSHB 4(TRA) will act as
a fairly strong deterrent, and will help reduce the number of
DWIs in the state.
REPRESENTATIVE BERKOWITZ agreed that there was a lot of good
work in CSHB 4(TRA), but added that he thought that if the state
were going to go after DWIs, it had to be done more
comprehensively. He asked Lieutenant Dunnagan what he thought
the impact on DWIs would be if the state were to put more
troopers and more law enforcement "out there."
Number 0474
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN responded that if [the state] had more
officers and more troopers on the roads, it would result in more
detection [of crimes]. When the manpower available is tied up
with calls and other DWIs, there are still going to be people
driving around who shouldn't be. Therefore, an increase in the
number of officers on the road would also increase the number of
activities that those officers would be able to perform, not
just with regard to DWIs, but also with regard to any other
traffic-related incidents. The officers could also perhaps
begin to participate more in a proactive approach to some of the
problems they face, which they are not able to do at this time
due to a lack of manpower. He concurred that he would support
an initiative to add more law enforcement.
CHAIR ROKEBERG said he was comparing the effectiveness of the
refusal-to-register provision with confiscating a license plate.
He noted that he was considering that it might be a lot cheaper
and easier to confiscate license plates for the lower levels of
DWI offenses.
LIEUTENANT DUNNAGAN offered to assist with researching license-
plate confiscation in an effort to determine that method's
effectiveness as well as an estimated fiscal note.
CHAIR ROKEBERG alluded to possibly amending the provisions such
that the first offense would require vehicle impoundment, the
second offense would require license plate confiscation, and the
third offense would require vehicle forfeiture. He surmised
that confiscation of a person's license plate could be done in a
simple, consistent manner that would not be that costly. He
noted that when a person drives a vehicle without a license
plate, unlike driving without a driver's license, he/she is
quite obviously doing something illegal, is easy to spot - at
least in the urban areas - and would get "busted" faster.
REPRESENTATIVE MEYER argued that in the rural areas of the state
a person is more likely to get away with driving without a
license plate in addition to getting away with driving without a
driver's license. He suggested that if the goal is to keep
people from driving while intoxicated, then the mechanism - the
vehicle - has to be taken away, similar to what now occurs at
the municipal level in Anchorage and Fairbanks for second-time
DWI offenses.
CHAIR ROKEBERG noted that his original intention with HB 4 was
to mirror the municipal ordinances that make vehicle forfeiture
mandatory on the second DWI offense, and thereby be consistent
across the state. He announced that at the next meeting on HB
4, the committee would address proposed amendments. [HB 4 was
held over.]
ADJOURNMENT
Number 1028
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 3:05 p.m.
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